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I 
Abstract: I rn th is paper ~..,e cansi der a v.ery genet- al f orrnui at ion for I
consumption set. 
. 
The traditional formulation and the allowance for a 
consumption technology may be taken as special cases. We allow for 
nonconvExities in the consumption set which arise, for e;< i:\ mpIe , 
due to the existence of' goods that may be consumed only in 
discrete unit~ (indivisible commodities). 
It seems to us that there is not in the literature an 
agreement of what will be the influence of these refinements for 
the main conclusions 'of the consumer theory_/ 
.; 
/ 
We arrive at results similar ~o the ¢onventional can 5Ufner ' s 
theory. Demands ad"d ~lP, are homogeneous of degree zero in prices 
and income and compensated demands and prices' are negatively 
correlated. 
We also obtain analogues of Shephard's Lemma, Roy's Identity 
and Slutsky Equation. These results provide a basis for 
integrability and welfare analysis. 
a - Introduction 
In its tr- ad it i ona.l f.or-m, ConSLlmer Theor-y restricts 
. 
Marshall i an demands ( ~.: = H (p, I) where p denotes the vector of 
prices and I denotes the exogenous income ) to satisfy the 
following properties assuming differentiability (to assur-e the 
differentiability of d~mands one needs some technical assumptions 
: u E C2 , is monotonous,~t~ictly ~uase-concave and satisfies some 
boundary canditions)1 
Pl : (Cour-not Aggr-egation) 
n 8-,'
" .,; 

:.: ~ + p. ~ = 0 for all i 
~
/
l\. J 
"P. /j=l \. ! 
F·,..,·...... (Engel Aggr-egation) 
n 8;< . 
p. \. 1= \.l 81i=l 
P1 ,and F'2 are, usually r-efered as "adding up" conditions Sln::e 
they follow fr-om the budget constraint and no satiation. 
F'3: (Homogeneity) 
n 8;·: iJv 
__ _ 
" 
_J_' __J_'l p. + I = (2) fpr- all j 
\. bp, bl
i=l \. 
Fr-om Marshall i an demCl.nd functi ons one ma.y bui 1 d the 51 utsk',.. 
mat y- i :.~. Let: 
{I'.' OV
" it 
vs, . = + ... 
i f or 'a11 i apd j (Sl~tsky equation)
\.J Jbp, bl 
J 
and define the Slutsky matrix as: 
S 
t.2 
s = 
S 
nZ 
One may now state the last two·properies: 
P4: (Symmetry) 
s. , = S,' for all i and j
\. J J\. 
,/' 
F'5: (Negati vi tV) / ! 
S is a negat.i'~e~serni:-definite matriK: 
'v S v :S IZ) for all v 
and 
p S = IZ) 
We know that any system of functions that satisfies F'1-F'5 is 
a system of Ma~shallian demand functions which can be obtained by 
.• D 1maximizing some uti 1 ity function u (eaton and Mue lbauer~ 1980 .. 
p.5/Z). This solution to the integrability problem assures that 
PI-F'5 exhaust the emoirical implications of uti 1 i tv ma:~ i i'!li :::2.t i 0:( 
under the regularity assumptions·above. 
The question we adress is: ~ow do Pl-P5 generalize when, for 
instance, discrete choice is allowed? 
It. seems to us that there is not in the literature an 
agreement of what will be the influences of these refinements 
for the main con~lusions of Consumer's TheGry. 
In Section 1 ~'Je pr-esent. the ba.sic notati'on c?nd c'lssumpti ons •. 
In Section 2 WE' e!-!plore. the implications of continuity and 
non satiation of .pt-eferences in at least one product. L.!Je deri ve 
the adding and homogeneity properties an& some duality results. In 
Section 3 we e>~plore the implications o-f rational behavior and 
p~ove the neg~tivity property and derive a.nalogues to Shephard~s 
Lemma, Slutsky E~uation and Roy's Identity_, We briefly adress the 
integrability problem. 
In the final versi on "'.Ie pI an to incl Llde Secti on 4 in whi ch 
we show ~ow welfare analysis may be performed in this context. 
We will also include a conclusion with a summary of the findings 
of the paper and sug~estions -for furthe~ wor~,~in particular, we 
.\ / 
plan to assess the possibility of performi~g empirical research in jthis area. 
I 
.. 
f 
i 
1 - Basi:e: Notation and A~sLtmptions 
Problem (U): Utility Maximization 

Y(p,I) = ma~·: Lt (:.: ) (~(p,I) - indiree:t utility fune:tion)

x 
s.t. 
}~ e D ~ {Rn 
where u(.) is continuous~ p is a yee:tor of prices (p>>0) , I is 
e ~.: og enausincome (I:> \2j ) an d D n { :.:: P!< ~ I. }- i ~ <3. co ITi pac t ss t . To 
simplify some proofs we will assume that D is a compact set. 
We assume nonsatiation and perfect divisibility in at least 
one good (in the rem~inder of this paper we wi!l take to be the 
.,/ 
first one, without loss of general~ty) to ~£sure that the budget 
cohstraint is bidi~g\and that some dualiiy results hold. 
The set of optimal solutions to (U) - Marshallian demands 
~il1 be denoted as { x(p,I) } • Note.that { x(p,I) } _ 0 for all J 
(p, I) consi dered (by Weierstrass theorem see Syds~ter, 1981, 
p.219). 
Problem eEl: Expenditure Minimization 
e(p,u) = min p'" e(p,u) - expenditure fun=tion
" x 
s.t. 
u (:< ) ~ u 
The set of optimal solutions to eE) is denoted as {h(p,u) ; 
Hicksian or compensated demands. Note that { h(p,u) } - 0 under 
the conditions above if u E { range of uC.) }-. 
The textbooks formulations <e.g. Varian, 1984, chap.2, 
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980. chap.2, Phlips, 198::. , chap.l) are 
particular ca~es of the formulations above with D = 
( imp Ii cit I y) • Debre·u (195~) assumes D to be a convex set.· 
Conve.;·~ i ty of D i mpl i es that all commodi ties are cant fnuousl y 
divisible. 
With the formulation above we can handle~ for instance, the 
cC'.se of the e>:istence of goods that can only be consumed in 
Zn-1d"'i s c ret e un tit s as D = { ( >~ .. }~ , E
l' 2 
and x E ~ } n { x: px S I } is a compact set (2i5 the set of 
1 
integers) • 
The con~umption set D may also r~flect, for e;{ampl e., 
restrictions derived from the existence of a consumption 
technology which may be nanconvex. 
,/ 
.\ / 
/ 
2 - Implications of continuity and nons~tiation in at least 
one good. 
. 

As we assume above x E ~ (x is the q~antity of good 1) and 
t t 
there is nonsatiation in good 1. With these two assumptions we can 
prove the following: 
PROPOSITION 2.1.: 
( a ) [ add i n 9 LlP ]: p!< = I N E { >: (p , I) }. 
(b) {:-~(p,e(p,u» } = -[ h(p,u) } 
(c) v(p,e(p,u» = u 
if ~ > (2) one has 
/ 
(d) [Homogeneity (1) J: v(~p,AI) = v(plr) 
(e) [Homogene'it~ (2)J: e(Ap,u) = A e(p,u) 
(f ) [Homogen e i t y (3) J: -{ '"~ (Ap ,A r) } = { }: (p ,1) } 
(g) [Homogeneity (4) J: { h(~p;u) } = { h(p,u) } 
Proof: 
[ & 0 o ... (2) J • 
Suppose not then px < I 
(a) For the proof we need to define 
I)}) and 3 & such that 
.& .& px SI.Therefore u(x ) > u(x) which contradicts the assumption that 
}{ E {!·:(p,I)}. 
(b) Take:< E (;.~(p, I)} and let u = u(}:) for ~.~ E {}:<p, I)}. 
From (a) we know that px = I. Now take the problem 9f expenditure 
minimization over D n {z: u(z)~u}. x is feasible to the (E) 
-.problem since u(x) ~ u for x E {x(p, I)}. 
Now we show that no better solution for the problem (E) may 
e~·~ i st. 
-i(.
Suppose that a better xED could be found. Thi S ""Joul d 
, 
that px * < I and u(x * ) ~ u. Using. the same argument as in (a) this 
would. contradict the assumed optimality ·of ~.: to the (U) problem.· 
We have proved that: 
{:.: (p, e (p, u)} S; {h (p, u)} 
To ~ee that the inclusion hold~ in reverse take x ·E 
(hCp,u)}. This means that px = e(p, u). So x is a feasible 
solution to the (U) problem and the~efore optimal since u(x) ~ u. 
We may then conclude 'that: 

{ hCp, u}} S; {x(p, e(p, u)} 

~nd the proposition holds. 

(e) 	 The proof of (c) follows directly fro~ the remark that 
• 	 J/ 
/
·\ 	 {~.:(p, I)} is the set of solutions to the leU) .pr"oblem and that 
ue~) = yep, I) fo~ahy x E {x(p, I )} a.nd (b). 
Cd), . Ce), (f) and (g) follow directly from the definitions of 
optimal .solution and of optimal value function. 
COROLLAF~Y 2. 1 
(a) eCournot Aggregation): 
1Let ;.:1 E { :-: (p ,I) ) 9-nd 

2 2 1 1 

vP 	 p;{ = 0" 
(b) 	 (Engel Aggregation) 

1 2 2

:':(p,I) ) and ;.~ E { ;.: (p ,I ) } then:Let 
2 1 2 	 1P ( ~.~ -}! ) = I - I or p fl.:.! = fl.I 
Proof: (directly from proposition 2.1.a.) 
then: 
The adding Ltp property means that the consumer e ~< pen d i t u r- e 
equals income. This holds because e~·!p~ndi ture cannot e>:ceed income 
and if e;.~ pend i t ur e . stri.ct less than income then (under 
nonsatiation and continuity of at least one good) the consumer 
could increase his utility by buying more of that good. 
The set of Marshallian demands is equal to the set of 
Hicksian demands if th~ consumer receives a compensation in 
income that allows her to· attain. a constant level of utility 
(proposition 2.1.b). 
Propositions 2.1.c has ananalogous interpretation and 
fallow directly from the preceding one. 
Propositions 2.'1.d-f (homogeneity) to the 
i ntLll t i on that the~-e is no money iII usi on. / 
~'-Jas 
• I 
Corollary 2.1.~-b (Cournot and Engel Aggregation) are. 
consequences of ~dding up. 
Note -that proposition 2.1. does not hold in the absence of 
a continuous good as we show in fig l.and 2 •. 
The example in figure 1 contradicts (a),(b) and (e) and thE' 
one in figure 2 contradicts (e) and (d). 
We give a more familiar look to Cournot aggregation if WE 
assume that only the first price changes. 
Then we have 
2( P , 
t 
- 2-2p) (:< , :~ )
t 
1( P , 
t 
- t-1p) (;.~ ., >: )
:l 
= e 
where p= (p
2 
, P 
9 
, ••• , P )
n 
and pj
:l 
is the price of the first good 
in the j situation. 
Rearranging we get 
P 1 6.>: + 6.p ~-: 1 + 6.p 6.;.~ + P.Ax = 121 
1 t t t 1 t 
if we assume differentiability in demand, divide the abOVE 
equa.ti on by f!.p and take the 1 i mi t as Ap .... 0 ~'Je g~t
i i. 
/ 
/ 
.\ ! 
o 
>
= 
..... M 
n iJv1\ 
.>~ + ---1. = III 

1 l P j 8pj=l 1 

which is the traditonal presentation of the result. 

,/ 
.\ ;' 
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3 - Implications of rational behavior 
. I 

PROPOSITION 3.1. 

t
e(p,u) is concave (and cQntinuous) in p. 

Proof: 

Define 

2 2 ­~.~1 E { } , . ~.! e -[ h (p , u ) } and h(p A , } 
A 1 2
where p = AP + (l-A)p and 0 ~ ~ ~ 1. 
1 - 1 1 1 A 
e (p ,u) - p !< ~ p ~.~ 
e(p2 ,u) by definition of minimum 
A - 1A 2A ~- 2­e(p ,u) = = A p >: + (1 - A) P!{ ~ Ae (p ,u) + (1 -:>...> e ( p ,u ) 
which shows the concavity of e(p,u). 
/ 
The cont i nl..li t y follolfJS f rom the ~oncavi t y. (see Fl cmi ng , 
- • I 
1977 , P p • 1 1 (2) - 111, ·th. \3 • 5) • 
LEMMA 3. 1. 
Take -p 1 and p 2 and define: 
~1 E8e(p1,l:d 

p 

,,2 (2-)j:.III ~ E u e p ,u p 
the concavity of e(p,~) is eq~ivalent to: 
( P 1. _p2) (~1. _{ 2) :s; Q) 
Proof: (see Clarke, 1983, p 37, pr. 2.2.9.> 
PROPOSITION 3.2. (Shephard '5 lemma) 

8 e(p,~) = cony { h(p,~) ]­

p 
Proof: 
-(i) Le~ us begin by proving that {h(p, u)} e 8 e(p, -u). 
p 
X* E 8 e(p, u) if, by definition: 
p 
}~ '*' (p - p') + E(p, u) 2: e(p', u) ( . ) 
-Jake x E {h(p, u)} and let the vecfor of prices change from p 
to p'. As x is a feasible solution ~or the new problem we have by 
definition that (.) is verifie~. 
(ii) "Furthermote it is ~asy to proof th.at same resLll t 
holds 	 for any x E conv{hCp, u)}. Formally: 

conv{h(p, u)} S oe(p, u) 

p 
(iii) 	We-no~J need to prove that tt'le reverse inclusion holds. 
That 	is: 

8 eCp, u) S conv{h(p, u)} 

p 

We shall prove it by 'contradiction. 

./
.\ 	 First we remark that as D is compact and ut.) is continuous the 
set { x (p, e (p , u) ,) . ]- \i sac1osed set. 
'Suppose there e}< i sts a E it e Cp, not in p 
tonv{x(p,e(p,u»}. Then we know (see ~ockafellar ( 1970) ) that 
there 	 e~,: i sts an strictly separating from 
conv{x(p,e(p,u»}, i.e., there is ~ scalar Q and a nonzero vector 
d sLlch that: 
dx ~ a 	 far all E cony { x(p. e(p,u» }A 
and 
d::: < a 
Now because of PROPOSITION ~_~ (balow) 
X E cony { x(p, e(p,u» } such that: 
e (p, 	u ; d ) ~ d !,~I 
thus 	we must have e' (p, u; d) ~ Q. 
On the other hand by PROPOSITION we have: 

g'(p,~;d) = min { dx: x e Q e(p,~) J S d~ < ~ 

p 
;;. contradiction. 
----------------------~,,- ..--­
COROLLARY 3.2. (Negativity) 
'2 1- 2-'(p -p )( h(p ,U)-t1(p ,U) ) ~ (2) 
~ ,..,Proof: from 1 emma 3 •.1 and proposition ...... ..:... .. 
Several authors say that· the concavit~ of the expenditure 
function is non intuitive. (e.g. Diewert, 1982,p. 539>.Nonetheless 
we think that we give an intuitive presentation of the result. 
To be able to pre~ent a graphical illustration we consider a 
change onl y in the price" of the f,irst good (see fig. 3. >. 
In the initial situation we have: 
1 , ­~.~ E { h (p , u» } 
and, by definition: 
1 , 1­P :.: = e (p , u) 
Consider now a variation in the price of tKe first good (~p 1 ). The 
1 
set of solutions ·t~ ~he initial problem remain possible to the ne~ 
problem. So we have, again by definition: 
, , - 1 -1 "­(p + Ap ,p) b~ , }: ) ~ e (p +. Ap , u) 
"1 " 
subtracting (*) from the above we get: 
, , -
Ap >~ ~ Ae (.., u)
1 1 
in particular the inequality in (**) will be strict if there are 
favourable substitution and <**> one m.s.',!' 
see that the line a + x 1 p (with is never below
.. , 
e(.,u) and is equal to e(.,u) at point p' (see fig. 3.). 
This is the intuitive content of the above pr-opositions. 
The intuition may be stated more simply by saying that when 
the price of the first good increases the compensated demand for 
the good can not increase. If there are favourable substitution 
possibilities it may actually decrease. 
To present the analogue to the Slutsky equation we need tc 
possibilities. From (*) 
\ 
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-
introduce the notion of a (qne-sided) direc~ional derivative of' 
. 

the e~-:pendi tLtre func::ti on, y.Jhich we shall. denote as e' (p ,u;'d) and 
define as: 
e' (p, Lt; d) = 	 lim 

A+(Z} 

PROPOSITION 3.3. 

e' (p,u;d) = min { 

Proof: 

The proof is presented in ,3 s~eps: 

(i) We shall establish that: 
-	 . / 
,\ 	 e' (p ., t.t: d ) 2: d ~,~ f 0 t'"' some ~,: e {~,~ (p , e (p , U}' ) } 
.I 
Consider a ~e~u~nce (A } ~ 0 and price vectors of the fot'"'mk

P'+A and let ~'~k E. { h (P+AIe,U) }.
k 
-By definition xle E { xED and u(x) ~ u } for all k and as 
.tv J....this set is compact, we kn6w that there is a subsequence 
..... Ie 
Ie 6 K converging to ~ point; E { xED and u(x) 2: G l. 
.­We shall show no~." this limit point must be such that ,', E 
{ h(p.,u) } .. 
We know that for any Ie E k we ~hall have 
-for any x E { xED and u(x) ~ u } 
Now taking the limit as k ~ 00 we have 
-p~ S px fot'"' any x E ( xED and u(x) ~ u } which together 
with the fact that ~ E { ",', E D a.nd u (>: ) 2:: u } shows :.: E 
By definition we have 
e(p,u) the= 
the (E) pr-oblem that gives e(p,u).). 
T h us· e ( p +Ale ' t::i ) - e (p , u ) /, AJc ?: d :.! Jc 
and tak i ng th-e I i,mi t as k -+ 00 ,-"Je have 
e' (p,t::i;d)?: d :; and :< e {. hCp,u)} { H(p,e(p,u» } by
" 
2.1.b. 
( i i) 0 e (p , L:i) 2 c on v { :.! (p , e (p ,·u» } 
p 
Let us take any x ~ { x(p,e(p,u» } _ { h(p,u)} by 2.1.b. 
so (1) px = e(p,u) (by nonsatiation and def~nition) 
And because x is feasible we have (2) ~x ?: e(~,~). 
Subtr-acting (1) fr-om (2) 'we get 
e(~,u) - e(p,u) S x(~-p) (3) 
/
., 
So, is concave, we have s~own that every ,', E 
• 1 . 
{ x(p,e{p,u» } i~'a\subgr-~dient of e(p\u) at p. I 
~ 
It is easily shown that if every x e { x(p,~(p,~» } is i 
~ 
tsubgr-adient then any convex combination of those points also. I 
i 
veri·Fies (~.) and so we have 

conv { x(p,eCp,u) ;. £ iJe(p,Lt)' which ends ii)

p 
(iii) We shall nbw tonclude the pr-oof: 
'Take any x E { x(p,e(p,u) }. Because of ii) E 8 e(p,u) thenA 
p 

fr-om i) 

r '\. 
'I- ~.~e' (p,u;d) ~ min d!< : e iJ e(p,Lt) J 

P 

Now take any x E iJ e(p,Ld. As e(p,Ld is concave we have p 
e (p+Ad, Lt) 
dividing by X and taking the ~imit as A~~ one gets 
e' (p,u;d) S dx for- any x E iJ eCp,u) 
p 
and then 
e' (p, L! ; d) ~ { d}:: ,', E iJ. e ( p , U ) .l 
P 
what completes the p~oof. 
It is 	simply, to inte~p~et prop. 3.3. using again fig.3.. We 
assume that the only p~ice that va~ie'!i is the first one. t 
. 	 J
In pa~t i CLtl ar suppose the first price i nCt-eases. The~efore 
d"= [ 1 0 . .. 0J. Then: I 
e I (p, Lt; [ 1 (2) (2)]) = min { ~.~ ": :< e {J e (p , t::i ) }
t p 
, 
...' 
. but t 
-{ d v • 	 !-: e (p, Cd "'I. Imin " .. .E i!J J = P 
1
= min 	 { d "...· .• ~.~ e cony -{ h (p, Cd )} =.. by prop. 3.2. 
-[ d'·· . ( h ~p, u) }}= min ..  i·: E = ••• . .. .. .because dx is 1 i near 
, 
{ d v 
.
• 	 \I,., -[ "\. "'I.= min " E ~.~ (p ,e (p ,Ll) J J .. • • • : by ~TOP. 2.1.b • 
/
. \ 
So in thE' abovE case: 
e' (p, Ll; [ 1 (2)' -•• ~ I (2) J) = mi n { X E { N (p,eCp,u) }} I 
i 
~ 
This result means that when ,the price of .. the first good 
increases (by one "smC'tll" unitary amount) the income compensation. 
needed to assure the consumer the initial utility level is' just 
th~ quantity of the first good in the demand consumption bundle 
that includes less of it. 
The prop. is a fundamental result that allows to 
construct a discrete ~ase version of Slutsky equation . 
. The proof of the proposition 3.4. (Slutsy equCt.tion) is rather 
long and so will be done using two lemmas. 
LEMMA 3.2.: Consider any sequence. {Xn}nelN 10. There e>:ists a 
sub-sequence {Ale} L•.·.-n..1 and k E ~(such that, for every & ;:. (2),1cEp..:::::s,n 0 
II x * :-:k II ~ £ , k > k", k E.K for somE ..,'* E {>: (p, e(p, u)} and 
Proof: 
. t 
Take an arbitrary A E {x (p, e(pj ~)~ and for every n E ~ 
tconsi~er some consumption bundle ~.! E {:':'(p + A 'd, e{p + A. d, U»}.·
n n n iAs we are worki ng in compact sets we know that there e~·: i sts a Iconvergent subsequence {>~I~} L'- Let us call :< * its Ii mi t. ~ leEr:'.. • 
Now consider the utility maximization problem (U) at prices , 
Because of non satiation we know that the optimal 
consumption bundles are 'on the .budget constraint.Therefore we 
have: 
• 
< 
I 
I 
/ 
Now if we take the limit as along thi~ subsequence we h.i:ive: f 
I 
I 
P .., * = e(p, Ll)" 
t 
because the expenditure function is continuous (concave)' on 
prices. 
So we.know that the limit x* is on the budget constraint for 
the utility ma~·!imizC\tion problem (U) at prices p. 
We proceed showing that x* is an optimal solution to that 
problem. We do it by contradictio~. 
Take any optimal bundle at prices p, xe{x(p, e(p, u)}. 
know we must have px = e(p, u). 
Because of nonsatiation in ~ood 1 we can build a sequence of 
bundles x ' k~(, of the form:k 
·in such a way that x is fe?sible foi the problem at pricesk 

(P+Alcd) • 

In fact, if we take 

e(p+Xlcd, u) - (P+Akd)x' 

p.+ AJcd. 

we have (P+Alcd)x = eCp+Akd, u), and, because of the continuity ofk 
the expenditure function and the fact that px = e(p, u), we also 
have: 
! 
,1 im 

keK 

Now, as x is optimal for the problem at pricE~ p+X d mustk Jc 

have: 

and taking the limit on kEl< one gets, because of the continuity of 
the utility function: 
U (!.~ ) :os; U (~.: * ) 
But as x *' is feasible at prices p we must have U ( ~< ) =U ( :-: *" ) and 
>~ *e{~·~(p, e(p,u»}. 
Finally we establish that the lemma holds because: 
~< * = lim :.~ o kJcEK 
~ ~ .LEMMA Take~1 ••_'. fit 
t 
-
>~A "e {}.: (p + Ad, e(p, u) + Ae' (p, ·u; d) ) } and 
e {:.: (p + Xd,e(p + Ad, " u»}hA 
.and let qA = hA - }-{A • 
If {:.~ (p, I)} is a sing1eton"then we have: 
11"m If qA II = Q) 

A I2l 

Proof: 

0m
First we prove (2) exists. Because of Cour"notthat 11 n qA." = 
A. (2) 

Aggregation we know that: 

/ 
(p + Ad) qA. ~ e~p+A.d, u) - e(~, u) Xe' (p, u; d) 
\ 
Because of the definition of directinal derivative we know that 
Therefore we must have lim qA = q* such that pq* = 0, soA10 
Now because of Lemma we know that there exists a 
sub-sequence along wich Xx. 1 >: * E {x(p, I)}. 
Now along this same sub-sequence we have: 
· , 

t 
and if we take the limit on the right hand side (which we know 
e:·: i sts) ~Je have: 
* . * h* ="lim (x~ + q~) = X + q 

~l{l) 

(sub-seq. ) 
'* ..We now show that h 1e ( x(p, I)}. Of course is on the 
budget set for this problem because: 
ph* = P ~.: * + p q '* = p}: * = I . (:.:* e {}: (p, I)} 
On the other hand hX is an optimal solution to the following 
problem: / 
./ 
min (p + Xd h·: 
s.t. 
Ll (>:) ~ u I 
>: e D , 
so we know that u(hX' ~ u and by continuity of u(.), we have.u(h '* ) 
~ u which, together with the fact that ph* = I shows that 
h *e{>! (p, I) } .• 
Now as {x(p,I)} is a singleton, we must have x* = h* and so 
uq*n = (l) and the proof is terminated. o 
PHOPOSITION 3.4. (Slutsky Equation): 
11'm II qx II = (Z)
X (2) 

that is 

for 
Xx e {x(p + Xd, e(p, u) + Xe"(p, u; d»} and 
hX e {x(p + Xd,e(p + Ad; u»} 
Proof: 
If {x(p, I)} is a singleton then ~emma 3.3. provides the 
proof. 
Now if {x(p, I)} is not ~ singletoQ the same happens to 
{h(p,u)} ~nd the expenditure "function is" not differ~ntiable. 
But as e(p, u) is concave we know (see Rockafellar(1970) , 
Th.25.5)that it is differentiable except on a set of measure zero 
n. 
Moreover there exists n > 0 such" that the expenditure 
function is differentiable at p + ~d for ~ e tn, nJ \A, for any 
0<n<n, where A S ~ is a set with ~t most a countable number of 
+ 
points (see Rockafellar (1970), th 25.3). 
/
.\ This tact of course implies that ~x(p + ~d, I)} is a 
singleton for A e fn~ nJ \A. 
I 
We now use lemma 3.3. to iho~ that we must have: r 
I 
lim I q~" = 0Aln ! 
for an ~rbitrarely small n > 0. 

Suppose, by contradiction, that: 

This would mean that, for every &)0 there would exist a X 
o 
such that: 
Now consider n e (0, X ) \A. (This point must exist because A has, 
~ 0 
at most, a countable number of points). 
I We know that for any X E (~ , X ) we have: o 0 
t
II qX" E (L - &, L + &) 
., t 
. 
b 
ItJhi ch contra.di cts the fact that, because of lemma 3.3. , we f 
must· have: 
The contradiction establishes the proposition. c 
We named the -above proposition Slutsky equation because it 
pe~mits us to construct the Hicksian demands from the knowledge of 
the Marshallian demands. 
Remember that we need to be able to ~link ordinary and 
/
compensated demands to give empirieell content to the negativity 
property above. 
to give morS familiar look to the expression,above we assume 
that the only price that varies i~.the first one. We also assume 
that th~ solution to the consumer's problems (U) and (E) is 
unique. In particular suppose the first price increases. Therefore 
d = [ 1 12} .,.. 12} J.. Then: 
lim [ h(p+Xd,~) - x(p+Xd, e(p,~) + 

X+(Z) 

+ X mi n { ~{ : x E { :.: (p, e (p ,u) ]-]-) ] = IZ)
• 
with d = [ 1 12} ••• 03. By PROPOSITION 3.4 .• 
Rearranging: 
h(p+Xd,u) = lim>~(p+Xd, e(p,u) + 
X+0 
+ X mi n { }! : x E { >~ (p ,e (p , u.) }})
• 
subtracting h(p,u), Ltsi ng proposition 2.1.b., assuming 
differentiability of h(.,.) and x(.,.) and dividing by A, we get: 
1 i m [ h (~p +Xd , Lt) h (p ,L{) I.X J = 

X.&.Q) 

= lime x(p+Xd, e(p,~) + A:·: ) }: (p, e(p, u) )IX J j.
X'&'(lj 
which by definition is: 
8h = iJv 8",.\
.-:.:.+ op ~.~ err8Pt t t 
which is the Slutsky equation as traditionally ~resented. 
To present the analogue to Roy's Identity we need some 
prelimary results. The first one which is interesting in its own 
right we state as: 
PROPOSITION 3.5.' 
./ 
yep,!) is quasi~convex in p. ! 

Proof: 

We need to prove that if 

2 - A.'-­
and v(p ,I) ~ u then v(p ,I) ~ u 
A t z
where p = A p + (1 -:-A.) P , 0~ A. ~ 1. 
We will give a proof by contradiction. Suppose not, then: 
v(pA ,1) :> t:i 
A _ .r " Alet ~< II:::: \" ,', (p ,I) ;. then L~E have: 
t A Z A. p:< :> I and p ~.~ > I 
but then: 
APt. >: X + (1 _ A ) P 2 ;-: A :> I 
X AP x > I a contradiction. 
LEMMA 3.4. 

Consider the level sets of the indirect utility function: 

P(I,~) = { p: v(p,I) S ~ } 

These sets are convex and its supportting hyperplanes have 

Proof: 
~. ( • , .) are conve;.: set s . because v (p, . ) - is .a quasi -conve~·:· 
.. function (see proposition 3.~). 
To show that the second part of lemma 3.5. holds we must show 
that: 
Ca) The hyperplanes px = I, x E Cony {x(p, s(p, u»} pass 
through p such that v(p , I) = u~ 
o 0 
(b) The set P(I, u) lies on the halfspace-px ~ 1. 
We first· show that (a) holds. Because of nonsatiation we have 
p v = I fbr all x E {x(p , I)}. We also know (from PROPOSITION0" 0 
2.1.c.) that 1= e(p', u).
o 
/ 
So v-Je have: 
p :.: = I f or . a 11 \:< E .{>~ (p , e (p , u» }
o . .00 
and (t is clear that the propositio~ also holds' for every x e 
Conv{x(p , e(p , u»}.
o 0 
Now we prove that (b) holds. 
Take any hyperplane: 
p~-~ = I X E {x(p, e(p, u»} 
and choose an arbitrary price vector p E P(I, u). 
We will show that px ~ I by ~ontradiction. 
Suppose that px ~ I and consider the utility maximi=3tion 
problem at prices p. 
Because of nonsatiation it is posible to find a bundl e -~-~ E 
{xeD: p>~ ::s; I} havi ng a str i ctl y better uti 1 i ty than :-:, u tX) )- u (;.~) 
= u. 
This would mean that yep, I) > u and then p e PCI, u), a 
contradiction. 
I 
So we must have, for every p e pel, u), px ~ I for any :~: E 
f{x(p, e(p, u»} and the inequ~lity iS,stil1 valid if we take any ~ 
. 
convex combination ,of th~ bun~les in {~(p, e(p, u»}. 
Thus we have that, for e~ery PEP (I, ld, p:., ~ I for any H e 
Conv {x(p,e(p, u»}. And the probf is terminated. 
PROPOSITION 3.6. (Roy' S iden.ti tV) 
Let x e { x(p,e(p,~) } then: 
px-l = ~ for I = e(p~~) 
and define ~(p,I) = 0 ~ px - I = 0 then: 
iN,! 
/ 
/op Ix(p,I) = , .aq.. \ 
.81 I
• 
Proof: 
'jDi~ectly from the implicit function theorem. f 
Therefore we derived analogues to the consumer demand 
properties presented in the introduction. 
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